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Abstract 
Background 
This article charts the relationships between the model of evidence-based practice (EBP), 
healthcare markets where providers are increasingly competing through the adoption of 
EBP-certified interventions, and the cultivation of experiential knowledge within self-help 
and mutual aid groups (MAGs). After 35 years of neoliberal reform, service user 
involvement in research, service provision and evaluation, and patient-centered care has 
been operationalized in increasingly measurable ways. In seeking to value and incorporate 
service user experiences, current models of EBP do not unpack the heterogeneity within 
experiential knowledge. 
 
Aims 
This article explores a more meaningful use of experiential knowledge than the cursory and 
tokenistic treatment it is often given. 
 
Objectives 
 Propose, illustrate and theorize the concept of ‘deep experiential knowledge’ (DEK) 
 Identify ways that the acknowledgement of DEK are useful in healthcare policy, 
governance and the clinical encounter. 
 
Methods 
Drawing upon case study vignettes, we analyze MAGs as epistemic communities of problem-
solvers. 
 
Findings 
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Deep experiential knowledge is a robust and collective form of knowledge, generated over 
time in the long- term members ('old-timers') and collective knowledge of MAGs. Five 
characteristics of deep experiential knowledge are proposed. 
 
Discussion 
By rendering DEK amenable to the logic of EBP, we outline potential benefits of 
foregrounding DEK in the conduct of healthcare research, policy and governance, and the 
clinical encounter. 
 
Conclusions 
DEK constitutes an authority that distinguishes different degrees of experiential knowledge 
of healthcare problems. Attending to DEK helps untangle some of the challenges posed by 
evidence-based practice for and to successful service user involvement. 
 
Keywords 
 
Deep experiential knowledge; mutual aid groups; self-help; evidence-based practice 
 
Wordcount 
8372 
 
Key messages 
 'Deep experiential knowledge' (DEK) is produced through self-help/mutual aid group 
(MAG) practices 
 DEK is narrative-based, collectively-produced, polyvocal and develops over time 
 Measures of DEK that would benefit evidence-based practice can be advanced by 
analyzing its genesis in MAGs 
 4 
 Acknowledging DEK paves the way for participatory approaches to healthcare research, 
governance and treatment 
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Introduction - Experiential Knowledge in the Context of Evidence-Based Practice 
 
Recent healthcare reform to increase participation can be traced through the changing ways 
in which the experiences of clients, service users and patients have been operationalized. 
One cornerstone for these reforms is evidence-based medicine, introduced by Sackett and 
colleagues (Sackett et al. 1996), and later adapted beyond the medical sphere as evidence-
based practice (EBP; Gambrill 2003). The EBP model is comprised of three components: the 
best available evidence from systematic research, clinical expertise based on professionals’ 
shared experiences, and patients’ “values and preferences” (Sackett et al. 2000). Sackett and 
colleagues emphasized the need for objective measurement in only the research 
component. However, the model's abstract presentation belies the neoliberalization of 
healthcare provision across all three components. Contemporary healthcare systems often 
predicate funding on the outcome of monitoring and evaluation metrics, while client values 
and preferences are increasingly measured in order to assess the efficacy and efficiency of 
services provided them (Dudhwala et al. 2017; Gambrill 2006). 
 
Beginning with the anti-authoritarian social movements of the 1960s, experience has 
gained salience as a source of political representation, often under the banners of ‘public’, 
‘patient’ or ‘user’ involvement (Beresford 2002, Fredriksson and Tritter 2017). Today 
service users are commonly invited to sit on boards, committees and steering groups, help 
evaluate health and social services, act as media-liaison representatives and train 
professionals from the vantage point of their experiences receiving the services. Critiques of 
the operationalization of service user involvement highlight the tokenism, 
professionalization and assumptions about representativeness involved (Madden and 
Speed 2017; Meriluoto 2017).  
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In seeking to join with movements to meaningfully incorporate clients' values, views and 
knowledges in healthcare research and service provision, this article draws upon studies of 
self-help and mutual aid groups (MAGs) as distinct sites for the documentation of 
experiential knowledge. By offering researchers of self-help and mutual aid, policy-makers 
and healthcare providers a more nuanced account of the epistemic attributes of experiential 
knowledge, our objective is to show how recognizing its variety and complexity alters our 
understanding of relationship between service user involvement and EBP, thereby 
responding to key challenges posed by the ongoing implementation of EBP. 
 
Our argument is that there has been a failure to grasp the depth dimension of experiential 
knowledge, wherein the value generated takes narrative rather than numeric form. Our 
interest in depth is connected to wider debates concerning the loss of authority under 
modernity (Arendt 1993[1954]), proposing that MAGs might offer instructive counter-
examples. As such our argument is consistent with postcolonial warnings about the 
flattening of all voices (Stengers 2012) and feminist critiques of objectivity (Harding 1986), 
while troubling the individualism often implied by terms such as ‘recovery’ and ‘person-
centered care’. 
 
The literature on MAGs is primarily available in the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, 
social work, and community psychology. All authors have conducted research on MAGs as 
primary scholarly interests. One of the authors (XXX) has devoted her career to the 
investigation of self-help and mutual aid practices, and was the final editor of the only 
journal dedicated to their study.i Two of the authors (XXX and XXX) have been Chairs of the 
self-help and mutual aid interest group of Division 27 of the American Psychological 
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Association. This article draws on the authors' extensive engagements with MAGs, as well as 
the wider research and literature on the subject. 
 
We begin by introducing models that seek to improve upon Sackett's model of EBM by 
acknowledging the experiential knowledge of the service user in the healthcare encounter. 
Such models open the door to analysing this way of knowing.  We describe the epistemic 
productions of MAGs, placing particular attention upon the difference between new and 
established group members. We introduce the term deep experiential knowledge (DEK), 
describing both it and ways of knowing it, and end with reflections on operationalizing DEK 
in our contemporary, measurement-oriented policy climate. 
 
1. From Patients' Values to their Experiential Knowledge 
 
The literature that has most closely sought to take forward Sackett et al.'s evidence-based 
medicine model focuses upon the direct encounter between service users and healthcare 
professionals. Charles et al. (1997), Légaré and Thompson-Leduc (2014), and Durand et al. 
(2014) have offered models of shared decision-making, most often identifying the 
professionals as generating the possible options from which a choice must be made. 
Karlsson and Oscarsson’s professional-user dialogue (PUD) model responds to these, 
suggesting the third source of information in the EBP model - the client component - 
remains undertheorized (Karlsson, 2016). Drawing on Borkman's (1999) theorization of 
experiential knowledge, Karlsson and Oscarsson insist clients’ input not be limited to their 
values and preferences, but also their knowledge of the specific problem/situation. 
 
Consequently, in the PUD model shared decision-making must be negotiated between 
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professional and client, where each party relies upon distinctive kinds of knowledge and the 
patient's experiential knowledge is understood as analogous to the professional's clinical 
expertise, and both together draw upon the best available research. Consistent with 
Habermasian modes of deliberation, both the space of the negotiation and the capacity for 
both patient and professional to draw on collectivized knowledges are considered essential. 
 
However the account of experiential knowledge in the PUD model itself does not allow for 
distinctions in the quality of experiential knowledge. We identify here a need to 
acknowledge heterogeneity within experiential knowledge itself. Certainly, the term has 
come to denote many things: for instance, sanctioned institutional research into service 
users’ recovery narratives, the literary genre of self-help, celebrity testimonials and illness 
narratives have been used to mobilize social movements in what has been described as 
‘evidence-based activism’, activism that engages the politics of knowledge and evidence-
making to win resources and improve healthcare outcomes (Rabeharisoa et al. 2014, Brown 
et al. 2010). In contrast with these, we draw on literatures that approach experiential 
knowledge as the knowledge generated within MAGs, to consider how this particular kind 
of epistemic production can speak back to the demands of EBP. Examples we draw upon in 
what follows include the 12 steps/12 traditions, weight-loss, mental health, stuttering and 
parent MAGs. 
 
2. MAGs as Spaces for the Cultivation of Experiential Knowledge 
 
In 1976, Borkman introduced the term 'experiential knowledge' to characterize the 
knowledge produced in MAGs, describing it as "truth based on personal experience with a 
phenomenon” (1976: 445). Soon thereafter, Borkman (1990) described experiential 
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knowledge as holistic rather than either piecemeal (like folk/lay knowledge) or specialized 
(like professional knowledge), emerging from the continuous and layered experiences of 
living with a problem. It included knowledge of experiences of stigma, interpersonal 
relationships, emotions at different points over the course of having the problem including 
the key existential-spiritual question of why this is happening to oneself, practical aspects of 
living with the problem such as taking transportation or the paperwork involved in dealing 
with service providers, financial costs and, inevitably, coping with well-meaning others who 
give poor advice. 
 
MAGs are defined as voluntary associations under self-directed leadership and with little or 
no financial costs, to share a problem or status which they seek to change through 
reciprocal helping and the generation of experiential knowledge (Humphreys 2004). Self-
directed or ‘user-led’ leadership refers to groups neither led by professionals nor beholden 
to any framework outside of that which has been collectively produced by group members. 
The idea of reciprocal helping evokes the aphoristic principle attributed to MAGs, 'you alone 
can do it but you cannot do it alone', together with Riessman's (1965) ‘helper’ therapy 
principle, wherein one is helped by helping others. 
 
We distinguish MAGs from more generalized support groups, which offer connection, 
friendship, information-sharing and an increase in confidence (Cope 1995), but are not 
necessarily focused on the epistemic project of knowledge production. Following histories 
of neoliberal reform and deinstitutionalization, hybrid forms of mutual aid that do not 
conform to all of Humphreys' criteria can easily be found - for example, support groups set 
up in hospitals that are run by professional staff and espouse a particular approach to the 
shared problems, or online groups run by a combination of peers and professionals. In what 
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follows, we risk an overly-clear cut distinction between user-led MAGs and professional-led 
support groups in order to highlight and further refine our understanding of experiential 
knowledge. 
 
MAGs can also be distinguished from the health consumer groups studied by Baggott et al. 
(2005) and the embodied health movements documented by Brown et al. (2004). While 
both MAGs and embodied health movements share practices of refining direct experience of 
their bodies and problems into experiential knowledge, unlike embodied health movements 
and health consumer groups, MAGs are primarily focused neither on challenging 
mainstream healthcare, nor politically-oriented activism in collaboration with 
professionals, but on mutual aid practices that enable a deeper understanding of 
individuals’ own problems through sharing experiences. 
 
Limited research has been conducted on who does and does not join MAGs. As Kurtz (2015) 
summarizes, chronic progressive disease groups rarely appeal to early sufferers who 
neither want to see nor be involved with later-stage sufferers. Negative stereotypes of 
occupying a ‘sick role’ also deter some people from joining MAGs, though this can be a 
misperception as most MAGs normalize and de-stigmatize the condition for their members. 
For example, outsiders may consider AA members to be adopting a stigmatizing label when 
they call themselves alcoholic within an AA meeting but the reverse is true: AA redefines the 
‘alcoholic’ member in a positive way as one who is likely abstinent and actively and 
constructively confronting their alcohol problem. The seriousness of the problem, level of 
psychological distress, degree of extroversion, need for affiliation and lack of an adequately 
supportive social network have been associated with joining MAGs (ibid.), while people 
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whose beliefs, viewpoints or demographic characteristics are sufficiently different from that 
of a specific MAG are unlikely to join or continue to participate. 
 
MAG-based experiential knowledge is vetted through group protocols and ‘groundrules’ 
that mark off the space - centered upon sharing circles, respect for one another's 
interpretive frames and minimal or no judgement or 'cross-talk' (Karlsson 2002; Munn-
Giddings and Borkman 2018). Other technologies for structuring experience are specific to 
groups and emerge over time, for example, role-plays that structure experience and 
generate insight.  
 
Experiential knowledge by definition is based upon the individual's lived experience, that is, 
learning through the reactions and habituations of the body. While MAG members may 
bring information from outside of their own experimentation - for example, from academic 
and media sources - it becomes experiential knowledge by being worked through embodied 
practices of experimentation, whose results are shared amongst other group members. At 
the same time, once it moves far from its source of its embodied production, experiential 
knowledge becomes codified and ossified.  
 
In understanding MAGs as sites of shared problem-solving practices, the question of 
whether any particular group promotes health and wellbeing or not is transformed into the 
question of whether and how groups produce knowledge and meaning. Of course in any 
instance for any particular person, these could be evaluated by given criteria as improving 
or damaging one’s health, but it is the knowledge and meaningfulness produced in the 
groups that is of sustained value. The generation of knowledge through practices of sharing 
and listening to stories at little or no financial cost suggests that MAGs can be considered 
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sites of epistemic commoning, pertinent at a time of reduced funding for healthcare 
services. MAGs entail resource sharing, community formation and emphasis on the doing - 
on commoning – the same three aspects to the commons identified by de Angelis (2017). 
 
3. Meaning Perspectives: Structures of collective experiential knowledge 
 
The term meaning perspective has been used in the self-help literature to refer to the 
collective knowledge about the focal issue, the challenges therein presented, potential 
workable and unworkable resolutions, and members’ resulting shared identities. Meaning 
perspectives can be distinguished from paradigms or worldviews, because they are limited 
to issues surrounding the negative impacts of the focal issue rather than entire philosophies 
of living (Suler 1984; Borkman 1999). The co-construction of a developed meaning 
perspective evolves as many members share their stories of living with the focal problem(s) 
and their various attempts to deal with its negative consequences and sequelae. Failures 
and near-failure stories are as important as success stories, as members learn from each 
other. Individuals’ stories are informed and shaped by the group meaning perspective, 
whose evolving narrative is tested by the dialogue across many members (Jensen 2000; 
O’Halloran 2008).  
 
In studies of MAGs, statements of meaning perspective appear in official books, pamphlets 
and websites. The major texts in the most famous 12 Steps/12 Traditions group, Alcoholics 
Anonymous (AA), are its book Alcoholics Anonymous (1939), and the Twelve Steps and 
Twelve Traditions (1952).  Official materials for which there is consensus among members 
are labeled “conference approved materials,” referring to the national decision-making 
body of elected regional representatives that meets yearly to discuss and approve 
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documents and other resolutions. Other types of MAGs have different decision-making 
processes to produce official materials. An official document portraying a MAG's meaning 
perspective can only convey part of the experiential knowledge of its members. An AA 
proverb is that 'old-timers' (a group's long-term members, contrasted with group 
'newcomers') are important role models as there are no pictures in the Big Book. 
 
A group member's narrative of their health issue develops within and in relation to the 
MAG's meaning perspective. Alcoholics Anonymous has been well-studied in these terms 
(Cain 1991; O’Halloran 2008). For example, people with severe alcohol problems often 
refuse to think they have a problem with alcohol, attributing their heavy drinking to other 
factors such as being victimized at work or having an uncaring spouse. AA regards this as 
part of the syndrome - denying that one has a problem. Cain (1991) studied how people 
attending AA learned about their alcoholism and developed their identities as alcoholics by 
attending AA and listening to other people’s stories.  Over time ‘the AA story’ arc came to 
shape their own, unfolding alongside their successful abstinence. 
 
The codified experiential knowledge of a MAG found in official materials can be subject to 
serious misinterpretation by outsiders (Walters 2002; Winegar et al. 1987), especially 
professionals with specialist knowledge of the same problem who often interpret the 
materials in their own frameworks. The casual misinterpretation of a MAG's meaning 
perspective offers a historical indicator of the lack of respect for the group's experiential 
knowledge.  Outsiders often interpret AA’s first step as if it comprised the entire program of 
AA. It reads, “We admitted we were powerless over alcohol, that our life was 
unmanageable.” (AA 1939). On this basis, AA and MAGs in general have been denigrated as 
leaving their members powerless (Miller and Kurtz 1994), rather than appreciating that 
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this is the first step towards empowerment and takes time and attention to be 'worked' 
before moving onto the second step. Thus, in providing methodological frameworks of 
action, meaning perspectives have been judged in terms of providing 'answers', when in fact 
they are also instructional, providing the schema by which experiential knowledge can 
deepen. 
 
MAGs with different meaning perspectives for the same health problem(s) generate a range 
of bodies of experiential knowledge. For example, Overeaters Anonymous (OA) and Weight 
Watchers (WW) seek similar goals but have different meaning perspectives: OA, a 12 
step/12 tradition group, has a spiritual component which enables it to speak to hope, 
motivation, and the will to continue, while WW, a commercial enterprise but with peer 
components, is based on research studies that view excessive eating as bad habits that 
require changes in one's environment. In WW, for example, group members are encouraged 
not to buy or bring 'trigger foods' home, and to go grocery shopping sated. WW deals less 
successfully with situations where a person is determined to overeat, whereas OA's 
spiritual components offer techniques to tackle this issue. MAGs with opposing meaning 
perspectives also arise - in contrast with WW and OA, Fat is Beautiful is a MAG that rejects 
weight norms and advocates for changed values (Borkman, 1999: 7). 
 
In cases where the instructional aspects of meaning perspectives dominate, group members 
may develop competing frameworks of understanding their shared problems. The success 
of the Hearing Voices Network (HVN) can be explained to a large degree by the meaning 
perspective it offers, to treat voices as meaningful and to decode the messages that they 
contain (Dillon 2011). Where psychiatry has sought to suppress voice-hearing, considered a 
first rank symptom of the diagnostic category of schizophrenia, HVN groups experiment 
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with transforming voice-hearers' relationships to their voices, and ways of living with them. 
Adopting an ecumenical stance towards explanations for voice-hearing, established group 
members will likely have come across narratives that rely upon a range of mutually 
exclusive explanatory frames. Rather than overcoming contradictory frames, members use 
the tensions between frames to generate ideas for further experimentation. The 
instructional aspects of meaning perspectives distinguish them from collective belief 
structures afford HVN members a degree of skepticism as they are encouraged to 
experiment with group knowledge. 
 
Meaning perspectives in the form of shared techniques for structuring experience belong to 
the group level, repeated and refined through their use in and around group meetings. 
Examples include techniques for learning what is knowable in the first place, learning how 
to cope with - and transform - difficult experiences, and for learning how to communicate 
difficult experiences through roleplay to those who have never experienced them (for 
example, Noorani 2013; Borkman 1999). Borkman has suggested that most groups that 
thrive for any length of time develop a “liberating meaning perspective” - one that is stigma-
reducing, life-enhancing, and constructive (1999: 115-138). A key reason MAGs restrict 
professionals from leading or controlling their group is that professionals’ meaning 
perspectives are usually so dominating that it dampens attempts to create a more suitable 
one to the members' shared situation. 
 
4. Deepening Experiential Knowledge 
 
With the term deep experiential knowledge (DEK), we aim to signal both the 
meaningfulness and the nuance of experiential knowledge. We also use the term to convey 
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an expansiveness, as the different narratives of others' experiences are interwoven through 
one's own embodied knowing over time, in dynamic relation with the MAG’s overall 
meaning perspective.ii While other types of collectives with mutual aid features, such as 
Brown et al.’s (2004) embodied health movements (Brown et al. 2004; Britten et al. 2015) 
are likely to have developed DEK among long-term adherents, in what follows we seek to 
excavate ethnographically the emergence of DEK in MAGs. We argue that MAGs include 
many favourable conditions for the creation of DEK. These include recurrent interactions 
between individuals sharing similar problems who seek to gain deeper understanding of 
the problems, relevant knowledge and potential solutions, without direct concern for 
appealing to, or challenging, the views of political adversaries. 
 
Within MAGs, DEK accumulates over time and can be identified most readily in old-timers, 
who have enhanced, extensive and enriched experiential knowledge. Newcomers to a MAG 
may come with rudimentary experiential knowledge of living with the group's focal 
problem(s); however, their experiential knowledge increases and deepens as they continue 
participating, hearing more narratives and seeing peers with somewhat different 
experiences, reflecting upon others' stories, and trying out new ideas and practices in their 
daily lives which they have learned from the group. By absorbing the collective stories of 
the group, the old-timers come to embody the collective in the singular, interpreting the 
multiplicity through their own lens (cf. Bartlett 1995). DEK is thus shared in three senses - 
it is generated through sharing stories, it is a living knowledge that only operates through 
processes of sharing, and people with DEK of a particular issue share a broadly overlapping 
body of (instructional and substantive) knowledge, manifest in the MAG's meaning 
perspective. 
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As a layered knowledge, of many stories of similar experiences shared over time and knitted 
through one another, DEK turns a single-voiced 'monoglossia' into a multi-voiced 
'polyglossia' (see Jensen 2000). The acquisition of DEK requires unstitching the 
judgmentalism entailed in the narratives newcomers share within groups, as similar stories 
suggest new interpretations and perspectives. Newcomers thus undergo an unlearning that 
betrays their overconfidence in not yet knowing what they do not know. At the same time, 
polyglossia lends old-timers a certain richness of understanding, such that details in a 
newcomer's story might lead an old-timer to a very nuanced comprehension of the 
newcomer's plight, through the warp and weft of the old-timer's accumulating knowledge 
base. 
 
The shared problems or preferred resolutions that emerge at the center of groups may not 
map onto professionally-defined problems (such as medical diagnoses or treatments). 
While pre-existing the members’ involvement in MAGs, their problems get reformulated 
and refined through involvement in group meetings. Over time, narratives interweave, and 
DEK detaches problems from particular individuals' biographies, and rearticulates them as 
multifaceted and experienced differently depending on life situation and demographic 
specificity. The problems that emerge are therefore not multiple but manifolded (cf. Mol 
2002: 53-85), and the way that old-timers’ DEK draws on this variety is interpolative rather 
than extrapolative.  
 
If the variation of experiences of the central problem or workable resolutions in a MAG tend 
towards distinct clusters, MAGs may split. The US-based Caring MAG for people who stutter 
split into two MAGs thirteen years after its founding due to emerging differences in values 
about type of speaking and new technologies: the Caring group emphasized spontaneous 
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expressive speaking with stuttering, while a new technology – the Hollins College precision 
fluency shaping therapy – emphasized fluency with a cadence and monotone (Borkman 
1999: 124).  
 
A key empirical question when attempting to draw upon the DEK of a group is how much a 
group member's experiential knowledge is bound up with the sociocultural idiosyncrasies 
of a particular group. As stated, within MAGs, the diversity of people and their narratives 
can work over time to reveal different aspects of the problem(s) that groups are centered 
around. If the demographic constitution of a MAG widens, it may shift the way that the 
problem is articulated and the most salient manifestations it presents. Similarly, changes in 
technology and available interventions can modify DEK. DEKs are nonetheless knowledges 
borne of particular point of view, and an acknowledgement of their meaning perspectives 
and demographic constitution allows them to claim a strong objectivity as 'situated 
knowledges' (Harding 1986) capable of incorporating reflexivity into their claims and 
practices. Valuing DEK then signals a systematic pluralism rather than an anything-goes 
relativism in knowledge acquisition. 
 
5. The Challenge of Synthesizing Narratives 
 
The imperatives of EBP are to provide healthcare services in accordance with the best 
research available concerning safety, efficacy and efficiency. In the instances that EBP seeks 
to synthesize such research with experiential knowledge, the latter is configured as a kind 
of immediate knowledge that any experiencing subject can report at any moment, available 
for feeding back into larger governance systems. This suggests that those who seek 
feedback may be unaware of, or uninterested in, the heterogeneity of the experiential 
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knowledges they are soliciting. Yet demands to assess the depth of any particular instance 
of experiential knowledge risk questioning the inherent value of the experience, perspective 
or intelligence of the service user, and thereby problematize the democratization of 
knowledge enabled by the concept of 'experiential knowledge' in the first place.  
 
Mindful of these dangers, there may be good reasons to consider whether it is possible to 
assess the depth of experiential knowledge. Firstly, without being able to make such 
distinctions, those with the confidence generated by not knowing what they do not know 
are easily be conflated with those who have DEK, despite being at very different stages of 
understanding of their problem and workable resolutions. Secondly, treating all 
experiential knowledge as equivalent enables a tokenism in service user involvement. 
Thirdly, people who are selected by policy-making bodies and advocacy groups as 
representatives may be sought for the social, cultural and/or celebrity capital they bring 
rather than the depth of their experiential knowledge regarding a given issue.  
 
While celebrities can bring attention to problems, they can also oversimplify problems in 
ways that undermine the goals of those they are asked to represent in the first place (Munn-
Giddings 2003; see also Borzekowski et al. 2014). Those with superficial experiential 
knowledge can be quite ineffectual mediators or 'brokers' in the politics of experience as a 
result (Boyce 2016), failing to retain nuance regarding recovery journeys throughout their 
negotiations with publics and funding bodies. For instance, celebrities who advocate that 
mental illness is "an illness like any other" often end up increasing rather than decreasing 
stigma by reflecting back the very same discourses of individualism and biogenetic causality 
that underlie prejudice against those diagnosed with mental illnesses (Read et al. 2013). 
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The collectivizing of stories in MAGs into DEK offers an analogical process to what in EBP 
has been described as the need to synthesize different kinds of evidence (Mays et al. 2005). 
The 'evidence' of EBP aspires to be based on the epistemic virtue of objectivity. In relation 
to contemporary healthcare research this is identifiable in clinical trials and epidemiological 
studies which attempt to sidestep subjectivity through instituting replicable protocols.iii 
While the elimination of the subjective may not be applicable to the MAG context, there is 
nevertheless a rigorous mode of collectivization at play – what may be more similar to 
Daston and Galison's (2007) epistemic virtue of trained judgment, where patterns, and 
indicative deviations from patterns, are developed over time. 
 
The compatibility of DEK with EBP is further complicated because the deep experiential 
knowledge of MAGs is not numeric in nature and therefore does not easily travel, while EBP 
has favored numerical standardization capable of easily traveling across contexts. As Han 
(2015) has pointed out regarding societies that value transparency, "addition is more 
transparent than narration" (2015: 29). While one might hope that the synthesis of numeric 
evidence is as efficient and fast as possible, the synthesis of narrative knowledge demands 
its own temporality, dependent as it is upon the unfolding of the narratives themselves 
(ibid.). We can expect both complementarities and tensions to emerge from these 
differences in knowledge synthesis. 
 
6. Ways of Identifying Deep Experiential Knowledge 
 
Ethnographic portraits of MAGs as active epistemic communities may prefigure measurable 
'indicators' of the depth of an individual’s experiential knowledge. Firstly, the duration of 
time working with a problem as a member of a MAG is suggestive of one's level of DEK only 
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when combined with an active principle of problem-solving, requiring experimenting with 
the stories of others in addition to rehearsing one's own (Borkman 1999). Old-timers with 
DEK will know many people’s narratives, both those similar to and different from their own, 
and move seamlessly between them and their own.  This depth enables MAG old-timers to 
be able to relate to the many permutations and combinations of what is essentially the same 
narrative arc. It differentiates DEK from the experiential knowledge that one learns simply 
by reflecting upon one’s own experiences. The newcomer who only knows her own story 
can overgeneralize from it, while DEK integrates many narratives, producing patterns of 
repetition and difference. 
 
Secondly, DEK can pinpoint the relevant questions to ask. In not at first knowing what one 
doesn't know, the newcomer can ask questions the old-timer recognizes as irrelevant to the 
problem at hand. Conversely, the old-timer may ask of a newcomer questions that appear 
unrelated, sharing a deeper connection that itself may not be explicitly articulated in a 
theory of health and illness. DEK acquisition thereby contrasts with the tendency to narrow 
the paths of inquiry when led by clinical and epidemiological methodologies. 
 
Thirdly, DEK recognizes the false narratives of individuals faking a problem or a solution. 
For example, participants who have attended AA meetings for months but are vague or 
unwilling to talk about their preferred drink, quantity of alcohol, drinking situations, and 
kinds of trouble from drinking are suspected by veterans as non-alcoholics since alcoholics 
usually enjoy recounting their 'drunkalogues' to peers (Maxwell 1984). 
 
Fourthly, DEK understands a particular humor about the problem(s) that is not 
immediately apparent to outsiders. When studying members of an early stage dementia 
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group in Sweden who recounted their cooking failures in frying pancakes, where one 
jokingly said (to widespread laughter) that she blames her new stove, and a second chimed 
in that she blamed her pancake spatula (to more laughter); Orulu interpreted this as the 
"laughter of recognition” (2012: 25). 
 
Fifthly, DEK cannot be obsolete - it must be an up-to-date, living, knowledge that continues 
to prompt experimentation through one’s self and sharing with others.  Oka (2003: 194-
196) describes conflict within Japanese MAGs for parents of children with intractable 
diseases, where current leaders with grown-up children have now-obsolescent knowledge 
of the treatment of the diseases but seek to retain control over younger MAG parents with 
young children who have up-to-date knowledge of treatment. 
 
DEK as conceptualized here concerns patterns of similarity and difference across a 
multiplicity of personal journeys. Over time, the possibility that some MAGs may develop 
more dogmatic positions on what a recovery journey should look like must be recognised. 
We suggest that these situations indicate a restriction in the DEK of the group, and possibly 
also in group old-timers who assimilate new experiences to preconceived narrative arcs 
without adding complexity to the latter or working the new experiences back through their 
own embodied experiences. This both illustrates how DEK cannot be assumed to exist, and 
points to the inevitability of debate surrounding the existence of DEK in any particular 
instance. 
 
7. Bringing DEK to Bear on the EBP Context 
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While MAGs may not cover the whole range of problems that EBP aims to address, in 
instances where relevant MAGs do exist, how can the collectivization of knowledges in 
MAGs, and the DEK of old timers in particular, contribute to EBP? The original models of 
EBP cursorily describe the value of what the client brings to the table, clearly contrasting it 
with professional clinical experience and research evidence components. Most times, this 
client component gets the least attention, and in practice claims to having experiential 
knowledge can be dismissed as anecdotal or ungeneralizable. Treating DEK as valuable 
opens up new opportunities. It may be fruitful to follow the implications of situating DEK 
within a history of attempts to collectivize experiential knowledge that can be traced back 
through the anti-authoritarian social movements of the 1960s. In this final section we 
instead reflect upon how service user involvement practices in research and service 
provision might draw upon the opportunities rendered visible through the recognition of 
DEK. We focus on three key areas of user involvement - research, policy and the structuring 
of the clinical encounter. 
 
7.1. In research 
 
In seeking to produce objective research, as is often requested in EBP, one poorly-conceived 
strategy has been to try to evaluate MAGs “from outside”, without adequate understanding 
of how such groups work. For instance, MAGs have been evaluated for their efficacy as 
narrowly-construed therapeutic interventions using randomized controlled trials 
(Humphreys and Rappaport 1994: 220-223), rather than as broader democratic epistemic 
cultures of experimentation. This kind of approach fails to grasp the value MAGs produce in 
reframing problems and inventing new modes of engagement. 
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A more appropriate use of experiential knowledge has been through myriad forms of 
participatory research. Much has been written on participatory researchiv and related 
traditions such as user controlled research (Beresford and Croft 2012), survivor research 
(Rose 2009), and recently, coproduction (Durose et al. 2011). Epistemologically, these 
traditions are all consistent with standpoint approaches that celebrate the unique insights 
available through personal experience. In recent years, participatory systematic review 
(Rees and Oliver 2012), narrative review (Greenhalgh et al. 2018) and realist evaluation 
(Pawson 2013) have risen to prominence as ways of combining rigour with experiential 
knowledge. In articulating DEK in this article, we add to these compelling calls for involving 
users in research by arguing that those with DEK would contribute more representative and 
nuanced knowledge to the research process than those with superficial experiential 
knowledge. 
 
In one example, six researchers, half of whom had DEK as recovering substance abusers, 
designed and implemented participatory research into how persons with substance use 
disorders define recovery (Borkman 2016). Findings included novel measures of inner-
focused and reflective elements of recovery. When tested with an online sample of over 
9,000 self-identified persons in recovery, these measures were endorsed by those with over 
20 years of involvement in 12 Step MAGs while not by relative group newcomers. In these 
forms of participatory research, researchers with experiential knowledge may not have 
what we have outlined here as DEK at the outset, but by devising methodologies where they 
share stories with participants, may come to develop DEK through the research process 
itself (cf. Rose 2018).v In a second example, long-term members of the HVN have been 
pivotal in reorienting the study of psychosis, driving attention towards the 
phenomenological variety and complexity of voice hearing and related unusual perceptual 
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phenomena, while bringing nuance to the construction of measuring apparatuses (for 
example, Jones et al. 2016; McCarthy-Jones and Longdon 2015, Woods et al. 2015). 
 
7.2. In policy and governance 
 
Hasty attempts to draw upon the benefit of MAGs in service provision can negatively affect 
their functioning. For instance, Schneider (2006: 122) calls for "clinical supervision for 
group facilitators" in order to govern the activity and discourses of groups that are funded. 
These attempts often fail to grasp the epistemic inventiveness of MAGs in producing new 
meaning perspectives rather than inheriting and propagating professionally-established 
ones. 
 
Within an EBP paradigm, the peer assessment that undergirds the clinical expertise 
component serves as a model for identifying DEK in regulation and governance structures. 
For instance, physician specialties develop associations to develop best practice guidelines 
and assess peers' levels of clinical expertise. Analogical models exist in other professional 
and tradesperson occupations, including the ideal of academic peer review. The ways of 
identifying DEK described in section 6 may help to understand how MAG members can and 
do differentiate between the depth of one another’s experiential knowledge. 
 
One example of an institutionalized attempt to have MAG peers evaluate and select patient 
representatives is in Germany’s statutory health insurance-funded infrastructure. Since 
2004, Germany has legally required the funding and consultation of MAGs, and including 
patient representatives on governmental boards and committees (Matzat 2006-2007). The 
law states that patient representatives must be knowledgeable and active (i.e. non-
  22 
obsolete) within their patient organization (Haefner and Danner 2017: 303) and are 
selected by the relevant patient organization. According to Matzat, director of a self-help 
center in Giessen, Germany, who was at one time a patient representative, 
 
“the idea was that these persons bring together not only their own experiential 
knowledge, but the experience of their respective organizations in its totality” 
(2006-2007: 291). 
 
This context appears to mandate that patient representatives are elected by their 
organizations and are expected to bring the wider experience of their organization with 
them. Outside of this example, user, patient and public involvement in healthcare rarely 
considers the depth of experiential knowledge of those invited to participate, focusing on 
important but distinct attributes such as the diversity of representatives (for example, 
Wilson et al. 2015). This can lead to individuals with limited experiential knowledge being 
involved. Enabling tokenism and the professionalization of a small base of service users, we 
suggest a reason for this is that DEK is hard to identify by those who do not have it. 
Consequently, it is difficult for outsiders such as professionals without a depth of personal 
experience to tell who has collectivized knowledge and who is largely speaking from their 
own individual experience. 
 
In order to ensure spokespersons have DEK, policy might seek to invest in infrastructures 
inspired by peer assessment models such as the German example outlined above.  Those 
with DEK who sit on boards and/or have influence through media platforms may still be 
coerced by the logics of the market, the soundbite or bureaucracy, but they will have a 
better chance than those without DEK to offer creative suggestions that trouble the 
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polarized options put forth, and/or to use their timeslot to destabilize overly-dominant 
monovocal narratives of what the 'right' way forward is. The fact that spokespersons are 
demanded in the first place signals a far wider problem of participatory democracy, but 
recognizing DEK will help illuminate what is at stake in the choice of representative. 
 
7.3. In clinical encounters 
 
To return to the PUD model presented by Karlsson and Oscarsson (Karlsson 2016), there 
are ways to draw on the collective knowledge generated in MAGs in the patient-professional 
encounter. Granted, professionals often have a limited time in their encounters with 
patients and clients. Moreover, as those with recently-acquired experiential knowledge do 
not know what they do not know, they may possess a temporarily over-inflated degree of 
confidence in understanding their problem, raising the stakes in establishing the patient or 
service user’s level of experiential knowledge. 
 
Each MAG has its own decision-making structures which produce collective forms of 
knowledge. Established MAGs have various mechanisms for codifying and packaging their 
DEK. In most 12 step/12 tradition groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous, knowledge is 
recorded through official books, pamphlets, audiotapes, CDs, films or other media officially 
endorsed by group. In the Hearing Voices Network, lists of what voice hearers have come to 
know about their voices encourage new voice-hearers to inquire further into their own 
voices. These meaning perspectives have been developed by groups over time. Where 
relevant to the presenting issues, these could be made ready-to-hand to primary care 
physicians looking to show patients how others have made headway with their problems. 
Healthcare providers might consider other ways of drawing upon DEK, including through 
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ongoing and systematized collaboration with local MAG groups. 
 
In healthcare contexts where peer support roles have been institutionalized, peer support 
workers need to be aware of the plurality of meaning perspectives that could inspire new 
patients and service users into epistemic self-experimental projects, which may or may not 
be a stepping stone to joining a MAG. Similarly, ensuring that a range of meaning 
perspectives are available through statutory-funded websitesvi and resources in primary 
care facilities, presenting distinct-if-overlapping frameworks for understanding a problem 
and moving forward with it, would allow new patients entry-points into their self-guided 
recovery. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article argues that experiential knowledge can deepen over time, and that MAGs are 
exemplary sites for witnessing this. We propose that DEK is a generative concept for 
ongoing debates concerning service user involvement and the role of experiential 
knowledge in healthcare research, policy and service provision. In contrast with 
understanding experiential knowledge as a pre-existing attribute of any moment of time 
whose characteristics can be fed back into the governance systems in which it is produced, 
conceptualizing experiential knowledge as a deepening fabric distinct from patients or 
service users’ values and preferences does not easily fit into the codification logics of EBP, 
where emphasis on values and preferences presumes patients or service users’ experiences 
are devoid of deeper epistemic content. Instead, treating DEK as inherently valuable leads 
down a provocative path, implying that some people do in fact know better than others - 
even when it comes to others' problems, illnesses, health and wellbeing. Additionally, as 
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dynamic knowledge structures, experiential knowledge may be inherently incompatible 
with mechanisms that seek to judge, using pre-existing yardsticks, whether MAGs are 
interventions producing positive or negative effects. 
 
Granting authority to figures, groups and networks that hold DEK suggests ways forward 
that unsettle the compacts between service user, client and patient on the one hand and 
service provider on the other. In contrast to consumerist or democratic rights discourses, 
we have attempted to follow the implications of the epistemic virtues of DEK without 
constraining it by the tripartite structure of the EBP model. Indeed, in situations where 
clinical research is recent, minimally replicated and under-funded, we might expect DEK to 
carry more weight. This opens up the possibility of developing robust indicators of clinical 
and professional ignorance (contra knowledge), as a complementary strategy to seeking 
indicators of DEK. More broadly, acknowledging DEK supports efforts to react affirmatively 
to the lack of objective knowledge, evident for instance in research funding calls, with more 
attention to what theories, hypotheses and ideas are being put forward by MAGs and people 
with DEK on the same topic. 
  
It may be impossible to square the kind of wisdom-oriented knowledge described here with 
an individualism that endorses recovery as whatever a person wants. Rather, the 
experiential knowledge whose indicators we have attempted to expound here constitute an 
authority – that is, as advice that one would do well to heed but by no means should, or 
could, be mandated to follow (Arendt 1993[1954]). The authority of the experiential 
knower may be generated in self-help and mutual aid spaces, but does not necessarily 
extend beyond them. If it were mandated universally, it would be inconsistent with person-
centered principles of healthcare, which in turn presuppose that new meaning perspectives 
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and paths to recovery are always possible. However, the autonomy of person-centered care 
comes at a price. This is not a tension that can be resolved theoretically, but one that must 
be worked out agonistically in each case. As has long been noted, authority's jurisdiction has 
become fragmented in modernity (ibid.) - and as with the newcomer to the group who 
speaks from one and not many, we must learn to feel its force. 
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